CVSS3
Attack Vector
NETWORK
Attack Complexity
LOW
Privileges Required
NONE
User Interaction
NONE
Scope
UNCHANGED
Confidentiality Impact
LOW
Integrity Impact
NONE
Availability Impact
NONE
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
AI Score
Confidence
High
EPSS
Percentile
20.9%
This write-up describes a vulnerability found in Label Studio, a popular open source data labeling tool. The vulnerability affects all versions of Label Studio prior to 1.11.0
and was tested on version 1.8.2
.
Label Studio’s SSRF protections that can be enabled by setting the SSRF_PROTECTION_ENABLED
environment variable can be bypassed to access internal web servers. This is because the current SSRF validation is done by executing a single DNS lookup to verify that the IP address is not in an excluded subnet range. This protection can be bypassed by either using HTTP redirection or performing a DNS rebinding attack.
The following tasks_from_url
method in label_studio/data_import/uploader.py
performs the SSRF validation (validate_upload_url
) before sending the request.
def tasks_from_url(file_upload_ids, project, user, url, could_be_tasks_list):
"""Download file using URL and read tasks from it"""
# process URL with tasks
try:
filename = url.rsplit('/', 1)[-1]
validate_upload_url(url, block_local_urls=settings.SSRF_PROTECTION_ENABLED)
# Reason for #nosec: url has been validated as SSRF safe by the
# validation check above.
response = requests.get(
url, verify=False, headers={'Accept-Encoding': None}
) # nosec
file_content = response.content
check_tasks_max_file_size(int(response.headers['content-length']))
file_upload = create_file_upload(
user, project, SimpleUploadedFile(filename, file_content)
)
if file_upload.format_could_be_tasks_list:
could_be_tasks_list = True
file_upload_ids.append(file_upload.id)
tasks, found_formats, data_keys = FileUpload.load_tasks_from_uploaded_files(
project, file_upload_ids
)
except ValidationError as e:
raise e
except Exception as e:
raise ValidationError(str(e))
return data_keys, found_formats, tasks, file_upload_ids, could_be_tasks_list
The validate_upload_url
code in label_studio/core/utils/io.py
is shown below.
def validate_upload_url(url, block_local_urls=True):
"""Utility function for defending against SSRF attacks. Raises
- InvalidUploadUrlError if the url is not HTTP[S], or if block_local_urls is enabled
and the URL resolves to a local address.
- LabelStudioApiException if the hostname cannot be resolved
:param url: Url to be checked for validity/safety,
:param block_local_urls: Whether urls that resolve to local/private networks should be allowed.
"""
parsed_url = parse_url(url)
if parsed_url.scheme not in ('http', 'https'):
raise InvalidUploadUrlError
domain = parsed_url.host
try:
ip = socket.gethostbyname(domain)
except socket.error:
from core.utils.exceptions import LabelStudioAPIException
raise LabelStudioAPIException(f"Can't resolve hostname {domain}")
if not block_local_urls:
return
if ip == '0.0.0.0': # nosec
raise InvalidUploadUrlError
local_subnets = [
'127.0.0.0/8',
'10.0.0.0/8',
'172.16.0.0/12',
'192.168.0.0/16',
]
for subnet in local_subnets:
if ipaddress.ip_address(ip) in ipaddress.ip_network(subnet):
raise InvalidUploadUrlError
The issue here is the SSRF validation is only performed before the request is sent, and does not validate the destination IP address. Therefore, an attacker can either redirect the request or perform a DNS rebinding attack to bypass this protection.
Both the HTTP redirection and DNS rebinding methods for bypassing Label Studio’s SSRF protections are explained below.
The python requests
module automatically follows HTTP redirects (eg. response code 301
and 302
). Therefore, an attacker could use a URL shortener (eg. https://www.shorturl.at/
) or host the following Python code on an external server to redirect request from a Label Studio server to an internal web server.
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
class RedirectHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_GET(self):
self.send_response(301)
# skip first slash
self.send_header('Location', self.path[1:])
self.end_headers()
HTTPServer(("", 8080), RedirectHandler).serve_forever()
DNS rebinding can bypass SSRF protections by resolving to an external IP address for the first resolution, but when the request is sent resolves to an internal IP address that is blocked. For an example, the domain 7f000001.030d1fd6.rbndr.us
will randomly switch between the IP address 3.13.31.214
that is not blocked to 127.0.0.1
which is not allowed.
SSRF vulnerabilities pose a significant risk on cloud environments, since instance credentials are managed by internal web APIs. An attacker can bypass Label Studio’s SSRF protections to access internal web servers and partially compromise the confidentiality of those internal servers.
Vendor | Product | Version | CPE |
---|---|---|---|
humansignal | label_studio | * | cpe:2.3:a:humansignal:label_studio:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_rebinding
github.com/advisories/GHSA-p59w-9gqw-wj8r
github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/blob/1.8.2/label_studio/core/utils/io.py#L174-L209
github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/blob/1.8.2/label_studio/data_import/uploader.py#L127-L155
github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/commit/55dd6af4716b92f2bb213fe461d1ffbc380c6a64
github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/releases/tag/1.11.0
github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/security/advisories/GHSA-p59w-9gqw-wj8r
nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-47116
CVSS3
Attack Vector
NETWORK
Attack Complexity
LOW
Privileges Required
NONE
User Interaction
NONE
Scope
UNCHANGED
Confidentiality Impact
LOW
Integrity Impact
NONE
Availability Impact
NONE
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
AI Score
Confidence
High
EPSS
Percentile
20.9%