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hackeroneMetnewH1:944025
HistoryJul 27, 2020 - 2:43 p.m.

Internet Bug Bounty: Uncovering file quarantine and UX security issues in macOS apps ( .terminal, .fileloc and .url)

2020-07-2714:43:49
metnew
hackerone.com
$750
47
internet bug bounty
macos
file quarantine
ux security
vulnerability
dangerous file handling
security bypass
chrome
firefox
cve-2020-6797
cve-2020-6402
keybase
telegram
slack
skype
whatsapp
wickr
signal
brave
onedrive
dropbox
google drive
icq
zoho mail
viber desktop
mega.

EPSS

0.004

Percentile

74.7%

Slides : https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/19WeQbqc_OKnrSv1I3Z4sm-oNAf6IVzHwRyQP4i9Bv_Y/edit#slide=id.g758ad3e042_23_231
See Blogpost for more details - https://medium.com/@metnew/exploiting-popular-macos-apps-with-a-single-terminal-file-f6c2efdfedaa

Summary

Popular macOS apps with a file-sharing functionality didn’t delegate file quarantine to OS leading to File Quarantine bypass (Windows MOTW analogue) for downloaded files. The vulnerability has low/moderate impact, but it can be combined with other custom behaviours, and UX features to increase the severity.

During the research, I also discovered two β€œinsecure features” in macOS: dangerous handling ofΒ .fileloc andΒ .url shortcut files, those allow executing arbitrary local files by the full path at shortcut file opening. This behaviour allowed me to discover two Chrome and Firefox bugs: CVE-2020–6797, CVE-2020–6402

Affected Apps

More than 20 apps, some of these products are on H1, some not and they deny disclosing the report.

.fileloc:

  • Firefox - CVE-2020-6797
  • Chrome - CVE-2020-6402

.url file handling was fixed in macOS Catalina beta.

Impact

Please, refer to the blogpost and slides.