Security Bulletin: Risks of Using the Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI) on the Integrated Management Module (IMM) and Integrated Management Module II (IMM2) (CVE-2013-4038, CVE-2013-4037, CVE-2013-4031)

Summary

Various risks with the Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI) have been identified and documented in the IT security community. Because the IMM and IMM2 provide IPMI access by default, a subset of these identified risks are applicable to IBM servers that include the IMM and IMM2.

Vulnerability Details

Abstract

Various risks with the Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI) have been identified and documented in the IT security community. Because the IMM and IMM2 provide IPMI access by default, a subset of these identified risks are applicable to IBM servers that include the IMM and IMM2.

Content

Vulnerability Details:

CVE ID: CVE-2013-4038
Description:
For IMM (but not IMM2), the passwords for user accounts are stored in clear text in the IMM file system. Users do not have access to the root shell of the IMM’s operating system, however if a user was able to break into the IMM operating system, he would have visibility to the user passwords. With access to the account information a malicious user could change the account credentials of other users or perform actions under the guise of another user.

CVSS Base Score: 4
CVSS Temporal Score: See <http://xforce.iss.net/xforce/xfdb/86174&gt; for the current score
CVSS Environmental Score*: Undefined
CVSS Vector: (AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:N/A:N)

**CVE ID: CVE-2013-4037
Description:
** The RAKP protocol, which is specified by the IPMI standard for authentication, has flaws. Although the IMMs do not allow the use of null passwords, a hacker could reverse engineer the RAKP transactions to determine a password. The authentication process for IPMI requires the management controller to send a hash of the requested user’s password to the client, prior to the client authenticating. This process is a key part of the IPMI specification. The password hash can broken using an offline brute force or dictionary attack.

CVSS Base Score: 4.3
CVSS Temporal Score: See <http://xforce.iss.net/xforce/xfdb/86173&gt; for the current score
CVSS Environmental Score*: Undefined
CVSS Vector: (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N)

CVE ID: CVE-2013-4031
Description:
The IMM and IMM2 are preconfigured with one IPMI user account, which has the same default login name and password on all affected systems. If a malicious user gains access to the IPMI interface using this preconfigured account, he/she would be able to power off or on, or reboot the host server, and to create or change user accounts possibly preventing legitimate users from accessing the IMMs.
Additionally, if a user fails to change the default user name and password on each of the systems that he deploys, the user would have the same login information for each of the IMMs on those systems.

CVSS Base Score: 10
CVSS Temporal Score: See <http://xforce.iss.net/xforce/xfdb/86172&gt; for the current score
CVSS Environmental Score*: Undefined
CVSS Vector: (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C)

Affected products and versions

All IBM servers that include and IMM or IMM2, including but not limited to:

• BladeCenter HS22
• BladeCenter HS22V
• BladeCenter HS23
• BladeCenter HS23E
• BladeCenter HX5
• Flex System x220 Compute Node
• Flex System x240 Compute Node
• Flex System x440 Compute Node
• System x iDataPlex dx360 M2 server
• System x iDataPlex dx360 M3
• System x iDataPlex dx360 M4
• System x3100 M4
• System x3200 M3
• System x3250 M3
• System x3250 M4
• System x3400 M2
• System x3400 M3
• System x3500 M2
• System x3500 M3
• System x3500 M4
• System x3530 M4
• System x3550 M2
• System x3550 M3
• System x3550 M4
• System x3620 M3
• System x3630 M3
• System x3630 M4
• System x3650 M2
• System x3650 M3
• System x3650 M4
• System x3690 X5
• System x3750 M4
• System x3850 X5
• System x3950 X5

Remediation:

For CVE-2013-4038, in addition to updating IMM1 devices to firmware version 1.42 (YUOOG2C) or newer, the following configuration change is required:

• Through the IMM web page interface, on the IMM Security page, Click “Enable Encryption” button in the “Enable Data Encryption” section.

Additionally, see the configuration options and best practices below:

• Change the preconfigured user name and password when the server is deployed. Doing this will prevent unauthorized users from gaining access to the IMMs through the preconfigured user account.
• If a user is not managing a server using IPMI, the IMMs can be configured to disallow IPMI network access from the user accounts. This can be accomplished using the ipmitool utility or a similar utility for managing and configuring IPMI management controllers. Here is an example of an ipmitool command to disable the network access for an IPMI user:

ipmitool channel setaccess 1 #user_slot# privilege=15

Replace #user_slot# in the above command with the actual slot number (1 through 12) and repeat for each IMM/IMM2 user that has been configured. The example above details the command when it is run directly on the server itself. If the ipmitool command is run remotely over the network, or if a different utility is used, the command will be different. Consult the documentation for the utility that you are using to determine the correct command syntax. Disallowing IPMI network access will remove the ability to use the weakness present in the IPMI RAKP protocol to discover user account credentials.

• Use strong passwords, at least 16 characters long with a mixture of upper and lowercase letters, numbers, and special characters. By using longer, more complex passwords it makes it more difficult for malicious users to discover valid user credentials.

• Keep the management network separate from the public network. Keeping the management network separate lessens security exposures by reducing the number of individuals who can access the IMMs.

Workaround(s) & Mitigation(s):

None

References:

• Complete CVSS Guide
• On-line Calculator V2
• A Penetration Tester’s Guide to IPMI and BMCs
• IPMI: Freight Train to Hell

Related Information:
IBM Secure Engineering Web Portal
IBM Product Security Incident Response Blog

Acknowledgement
None

Change History
1 August 2013: Original Copy Published
14 January 2014: Updated with IMM1 version fixing CVE-2013-4038

*The CVSS Environment Score is customer environment specific and will ultimately impact the Overall CVSS Score. Customers can evaluate the impact of this vulnerability in their environments by accessing the links in the Reference section of this Flash.

Note: According to the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST), the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is an “industry open standard designed to convey vulnerability severity and help to determine urgency and priority of response.” IBM PROVIDES THE CVSS SCORES “AS IS” WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, INCLUDING THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. CUSTOMERS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF ANY ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL SECURITY VULNERABILITY.