In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: ecdh - explicitly zeroize private_key
private_key is overwritten with the key parameter passed in by the
caller (if present), or alternatively a newly generated private key.
However, it is possible that the caller provides a key (or the newly
generated key) which is shorter than the previous key. In that
scenario, some key material from the previous key would not be
overwritten. The easiest solution is to explicitly zeroize the entire
private_key array first.
Note that this patch slightly changes the behavior of this function:
previously, if the ecc_gen_privkey failed, the old private_key would
remain. Now, the private_key is always zeroized. This behavior is
consistent with the case where params.key is set and ecc_is_key_valid
fails.
git.kernel.org/stable/c/39173b04abda87872b43c331468a4a14f8f05ce8
git.kernel.org/stable/c/73e5984e540a76a2ee1868b91590c922da8c24c9
git.kernel.org/stable/c/80575b252ab0358b7e93895b2a510beb3cb3f975
git.kernel.org/stable/c/d96187eb8e59b572a8e6a68b6a9837a867ea29df
git.kernel.org/stable/c/fd7ef325911eba1b7191b83cb580463242f2090d