(RHSA-2017:1583) Important: bind security and bug fix update

The Berkeley Internet Name Domain (BIND) is an implementation of the Domain Name System (DNS) protocols. BIND includes a DNS server (named); a resolver library (routines for applications to use when interfacing with DNS); and tools for verifying that the DNS server is operating correctly.

Security Fix(es):

• A denial of service flaw was found in the way BIND handled responses containing a DNAME answer. A remote attacker could use this flaw to make named exit unexpectedly with an assertion failure via a specially crafted DNS response. (CVE-2016-8864)

• A denial of service flaw was found in the way BIND processed a response to an ANY query. A remote attacker could use this flaw to make named exit unexpectedly with an assertion failure via a specially crafted DNS response. (CVE-2016-9131)

• A denial of service flaw was found in the way BIND handled a query response containing inconsistent DNSSEC information. A remote attacker could use this flaw to make named exit unexpectedly with an assertion failure via a specially crafted DNS response. (CVE-2016-9147)

• A denial of service flaw was found in the way BIND handled an unusually-formed DS record response. A remote attacker could use this flaw to make named exit unexpectedly with an assertion failure via a specially crafted DNS response. (CVE-2016-9444)

• A denial of service flaw was found in the way BIND handled a query response containing CNAME or DNAME resource records in an unusual order. A remote attacker could use this flaw to make named exit unexpectedly with an assertion failure via a specially crafted DNS response. (CVE-2017-3137)

Red Hat would like to thank ISC for reporting these issues. Upstream acknowledges Tony Finch (University of Cambridge) and Marco Davids (SIDN Labs) as the original reporters of CVE-2016-8864.

Bug Fix(es):

• ICANN is planning to perform a Root Zone DNSSEC Key Signing Key (KSK) rollover during October 2017. Maintaining an up-to-date KSK is essential for ensuring that validating DNS resolvers continue to function following the rollover. (BZ#1459648)