Once an user is authenticated on Jolokia, he can potentially trigger arbitrary code execution.
In details, in ActiveMQ configurations, jetty allows
org.jolokia.http.AgentServlet to handler request to /api/jolokia
org.jolokia.http.HttpRequestHandler#handlePostRequest is able to
create JmxRequest through JSONObject. And calls to
org.jolokia.http.HttpRequestHandler#executeRequest.
Into deeper calling stacks,
org.jolokia.handler.ExecHandler#doHandleRequest can be invoked
through refection. This could lead to RCE through via
various mbeans. One example is unrestricted deserialization in jdk.management.jfr.FlightRecorderMXBeanImpl which exists on Java version above 11.
1 Call newRecording.
2 Call setConfiguration. And a webshell data hides in it.
3 Call startRecording.
4 Call copyTo method. The webshell will be written to a .jsp file.
The mitigation is to restrict (by default) the actions authorized on Jolokia, or disable Jolokia.
A more restrictive Jolokia configuration has been defined in default ActiveMQ distribution. We encourage users to upgrade to ActiveMQ distributions version including updated Jolokia configuration: 5.16.6, 5.17.4, 5.18.0, 6.0.0.
[
{
"collectionURL": "https://repo.maven.apache.org/maven2",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "org.apache.activemq:apache-activemq",
"product": "Apache ActiveMQ",
"vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "5.16.6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.17.4",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.17.0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.18.0"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.0.0"
}
]
}
]