CVE-2022-41678

Once an user is authenticated on Jolokia, he can potentially trigger
arbitrary code execution. In details, in ActiveMQ configurations, jetty
allows org.jolokia.http.AgentServlet to handler request to /api/jolokia
org.jolokia.http.HttpRequestHandler#handlePostRequest is able to create
JmxRequest through JSONObject. And calls to
org.jolokia.http.HttpRequestHandler#executeRequest. Into deeper calling
stacks, org.jolokia.handler.ExecHandler#doHandleRequest can be invoked
through refection. This could lead to RCE through via various mbeans. One
example is unrestricted deserialization in
jdk.management.jfr.FlightRecorderMXBeanImpl which exists on Java version
above 11. 1 Call newRecording. 2 Call setConfiguration. And a webshell data
hides in it. 3 Call startRecording. 4 Call copyTo method. The webshell will
be written to a .jsp file. The mitigation is to restrict (by default) the
actions authorized on Jolokia, or disable Jolokia. A more restrictive
Jolokia configuration has been defined in default ActiveMQ distribution. We
encourage users to upgrade to ActiveMQ distributions version including
updated Jolokia configuration: 5.16.6, 5.17.4, 5.18.0, 6.0.0.